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'Ben-Hur's History Goes Back A Ways
At first glance, the new film Ben-Hur is a curious beast. While obviously a reimagining of the 1959 classic film of the same name, its original roots are somewhat murkier. The movie tells the tale of Judah Ben-Hur, a Jewish prince from Jerusalem who is enslaved by the Romans after being betrayed by his adoptive brother Massala, a Roman officer. Oh, and Jesus also factors into the movie. So where did this story come from? Is Ben-Hur a true story, or perhaps based on the Bible? Or, is it simply historical fiction? The movie raises some big questions.
The new version is actually the fifth film to tell the story of Ben-Hur . There's a 2003 animated version, featuring 1959 star Charlton Heston as the voice of Ben-Hur, but even Heston's classic mid-century version wasn't the original telling. It was a remake of a 1925 silent film, which itself followed a 1907 silent short film. So where did the story begin? In a book, actually. Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ is an 1880 novel by American author Lew Wallace. And since it's a novel, that means the tale of Ben-Hur is 100 percent fiction, wholly created by Wallace. So what is Jesus doing in the story?
Ben-Hur is considered a Christian novel, perhaps the most influential one of all time. It uses the fictional character of Judah Ben-Hur to work as an allegory for Jesus' life. The two men are depicted as having existed at the same time, both Jews in Roman-occupied Israel, and their lives mirror each other. Much of the tale of Ben-Hur has to do with his journey toward revenge. After being falsely accused of a crime and enslaved, his family and possessions are also taken away from him — leaving him with nothing. He trains to become a charioteer, with vengeance against Massala on his mind. But his various run-ins with Jesus at important times in his quest cause him to change his outlook on life, culminating with him witnessing Jesus accepting his crucifixion and realizing that forgiveness is a more valuable asset than vengeance.
The book is one of the best-selling novels of all-time, selling an estimated 50 million copies in its history — more than classics like Gone With the Wind, To Kill a Mockingbird, and The Great Gatsby. It was the best-selling novel of the 19th Century, and also has the distinction of being the first work of fiction to ever have been blessed by a pope, Pope Leo XIII. Clearly, the book is not lacking for accolades, so it's no wonder Hollywood has come calling for a fifth time.
If you make a claim on your policy where your insurer pays out, you&rsquoll generally lose some, or all, of your no-claims bonus.
But if you&rsquore hit by another car and you weren&rsquot at fault, your insurer may be able to reclaim the payout from the other car&rsquos insurer. This will leave your NCB intact.
In cases where fault can&rsquot be agreed on, insurers may split the cost of the claims. In this case, both drivers&rsquo NCB could be affected. This includes if your car is stolen or damaged by bad weather.
If you pay for a new policy with a reduced NCB and are later found not at fault, you can usually get your NCB reinstated. They'll also refund the extra money you paid on your premium.
Brothers and sisters of young people with this disease have a higher risk for HL. The risk is very high for an identical twin of a person with HL. But a family link is still uncommon – most people with HL do not have a family history of it.
It’s not clear why family history might increase risk. It might be because family members have similar childhood exposures to certain infections (such as Epstein-Barr virus), because they share inherited gene changes that make them more likely to get HL, or some combination of these factors.
AstraZeneca: more than 70%
Evans said it was harder to ascertain a figure for AstraZeneca's vaccine because late-stage trials used differing study designs, and a large US study was ongoing. The FDA also has not yet presented the data for the shot in the same way it has done for other vaccines.
A single dose of AstraZeneca's shot was 76% effective at protecting against COVID-19 with symptoms for at least 90 days, according to late-stage-trial data published in The Lancet on February 19. The study authors also reported that one dose provided 100% protection against hospitalization, but the numbers were small.
Based on his reading of existing studies, Evans said the single-dose efficacy for AstraZeneca's vaccine was probably at least 70% against COVID-19 with symptoms for the first 90 days. After this time period, it's unclear, he said.
15. 1,663,000 Murdered? Orwellian North Korea
16. 1,417,000 Murdered? Barbarous Mexico
17. 1,066,000 Murdered? Feudal Russia
References IMPORTANT NOTE: Among all the democide estimates appearing in this book, some have been revised upward. I have changed that for Mao's famine, 1958-1962, from zero to 38,000,000. And thus I have had to change the overall democide for the PRC (1928-1987) from 38,702,000 to 76,702,000. Details here.
I have changed my estimate for colonial democide from 870,000 to an additional 50,000,000. Details here.
Thus, the new world total: old total 1900-1999 = 174,000,000. New World total = 174,000,000 + 38,000,000 (new for China) + 50,000,000 (new for Colonies) = 262,000,000.
Just to give perspective on this incredible murder by government, if all these bodies were laid head to toe, with the average height being 5', then they would circle the earth ten times. Also, this democide murdered 6 times more people than died in combat in all the foreign and internal wars of the century. Finally, given popular estimates of the dead in a major nuclear war, this total democide is as though such a war did occur, but with its dead spread over a century.
FIGURES AND TABLES
Given the extent and detail of these books, the reader may be surprised that the primary purpose was not to describe democide itself, but to determine its nature and amount in order to test the theory that democracies are inherently nonviolent. They should have no wars between them, the least foreign violence and government related or directed domestic violence (revolutions, coups, guerrilla war, and the like), and relatively little domestic democide. I have substantiated the war, foreign, and domestic violence parts of this theory in previous works 3 and took up the research associated with this book and its three predecessors in order to test the democide component. As will be seen, the results here clearly and decisively show that democracies commit less democide than other regimes. These results also well illustrate the principle underlying all my findings on war, collective violence, and democide, which is that the less freedom people have the more violence, the more freedom the less violence. I put this here as the Power Principle: power kills, absolute power kills absolutely .
In developing the statistics for this and the previous three volumes, almost 8,200 estimates of war, domestic violence, genocide, mass murder, and other relevant data, were recorded from over a thousand sources. I then did over 4,200 consolidations and calculations on these estimates and organized everything into tables of estimates, calculations, and sources totaling more than 18,100 rows. My intent is to be as explicit and public as possible so that others can evaluate, correct, and build on this work. I give the appendices for the Soviet, Chinese, and Nazi democide in my books on them. The appendices for this book were too massive to include here (one appendix table alone amounts to over 50 pages) and are given in a supplementary volume titled Statistics of Democide . I also include therein the details and results of various kinds of multivariate analysis of this democide and related data.
Then what is covered here? This book presents the primary results, tables, and figures, and most important, an historical sketch of the major cases of democide--those in which 1,000,000 or more people were killed by a regime. The first chapter is the summary and conclusion of this work on democide, and underlines the roles of democracy and power. Following this, chapter 2 in Part 1 introduces the new concept of democide . It defines and elaborates it, shows that democide subsumes genocidal killing , as well as the concepts of politicide and mass murder , and then tries to anticipate questions that the concept may arouse. It argues that democide is for the killing by government definitionally similar to the domestic crime of murder by individuals, and that murderer is an appropriate label for those regimes that commit democide. Readers that are satisfied with the thumbnail definition of democide as murder by government, including genocidal killing, 4 can ignore this chapter. It is essential, however, for those with a professional interest in the results or wish to question the conclusions.
Following this chapter is a rough sketch of democide before the 20th century. Although hardly any historical accounting has been done for genocide and mass murder, as for the Amerindians slaughtered by European colonists or Europeans massacred during the Thirty Years War, a number of specific democidal events and episodes can be described with some historical accuracy and a description of these provides perspective on 20th century democide. I have in mind particularly the human devastation wrought by the Mongols, the journey of death by slaves from capture through transportation to the Old and New Worlds, the incredible bloodletting of the Taiping Rebellion, and the infamous Paris executions and relatively unknown genocide of the French Revolution. The upshot of this chapter is to show that democide has been very much a part of human history and that in some cases, even without the benefit of modern killing technology and implementing bureaucracy, people were beheaded, stabbed, or sliced to death by the hundreds of thousands within a short duration. In some cities captured by the Mongols, for example, they allegedly massacred over 1,000,000 men, women, and children.
Parts 2 to 4 present all the regimes murdering 1,000,000 or more people in this century, a chapter on each. These are written so as to show which regime committed what democide, how and why. The emphasis is on the connection between a regime, its intentions, and its democide. Although each of the case studies drives toward some final accounting of the democide, the specifics of such figures and the nature and problems in the statistics are ignored. These are rather dealt with in each appendix to a case study (given in Statistics of Democide ), where each table of estimates, sources, and calculations is preceded by a detailed discussion of the estimates and the manner in which the totals were determined. The historical description of a case given here is only meant to provide an understanding of the democide. For this reason many specific examples will be given of the kind and nature of a regime's killing. I have generally avoided, however, tales of brutal torture and savage killing unless such were useful to illustrate an aspect of the democide.
These chapters are ordered from the greatest of these killers to the lesser ones, as one can see from the table of contents. Part 2 presents the four deka-megamurderers , beginning with a chapter on the Soviet Union's near 61,000,000 murdered, then including chapters on Communist China and Nazi Germany, and ending with a chapter on the now virtually unremembered killing of the Chinese Nationalist regime. Since these four regimes were the subjects of the previous three volumes, 5 the four chapters simply summarize the democide and conclusions. I hope I will be excused for using Greek prefixes for labeling these regimes ( deka - means ten or tens mega - means million), but we need concepts for the various levels of government murder and there is no comparable English term ("murderer of tens of millions" is clumsy).
Part 3 presents in order the lesser-megamurders , those that have killed 1,000,000 to less than 10,000,000 citizens and foreigners. A chapter also is devoted to each. In some cases, as for Poland's murder of ethnic Germans and Reichdeutsch, a whole series of events spanning several countries was covered. In this case Poland's treatment of these Germans was part of a pattern of expulsion from Eastern Europe after World War II. In some cases also, several successive regimes for the same country had committed democide and these were therefore treated together, as for the Sihanouk, Lon Nol, Pol Pot, and Samrim regimes of Cambodia.
There were three regimes--those of the Czar in Russia, North Korea's, and Mexico's from 1900 to 1920--for which the estimates were not sufficient in number or quality to make a final determination of their democide. What estimates there were total over 1,000,000 murdered, but I treat this total as only an indictment for murder. These three are described in Part 4 as suspected megamurders .
In summary chapter 1 and in each of the case studies I present democide totals of one sort or another. With the exception of those that are directly cited from other works, how have I determined these figures, such as that Khmer Rouge regime likely murdered 2,000,000 Cambodians? The prior question is: how should these democide figures I give, totals or otherwise, by looked at? As, with little doubt, wrong! I would be amazed if future archival, historical research, and confessions of the perpetrators came up with this figure or one within 10 percent of it. Regimes and their agents often do not record all their murders and what they do record will be secret. Even, however, when such archives are available, such as after defeat in war, and they are kept by the most technologically advanced of regimes with a cultural propensity for record keeping and obedience to authority, and a bureaucratic apparatus doing the murders systematically, the total number of victims cannot be agreed upon. Consider that even after all the effort over forty-five years by the best scholars of the Holocaust to count how many Jews were killed by the Nazis, even with total access to surviving documents in the Nazi archives and the first hand reports of survivors and participants, the difference between the lowest and highest of the best estimates is still 41 percent . 6
All the totals and figures in this book should therefore be viewed as rough approximations, as suggestive of an order of magnitude. This gross uncertainty then creates a rhetorical problem. How does one assert consistently and throughout a book such as this that each democide figure, as of the Khmer Rough having killed 2,000,000 Cambodians, is really a numerical haze--that we do not know the true total and that it may be instead 600,000 or even 3,000,000 that they killed? Except in cases where it is difficult to assert without qualification a specific figure (as in the chapter titles), or space and form do not allow a constant repetition of ranges, as in the summary chapter, I will give the probable range of democide and then assert a "most likely" (or "probable" or "conservative") mid-estimate. Thus, I will conclude in chapter 9 that the Khmer Rouge likely killed from 600,000 to 3,000,000 of their people, probably 2,000,000 (this mid-value is simply a subjective probability and will be discussed shortly). All the appendices will develop and discuss such a range. For sub-totals in the historical description of a case I usually simply mention the mid-value, qualified as mentioned.
The how and why of an alleged democide range then is critical and it is not determined casually. Now, I have elsewhere published the methods that I use 7 to assess the democide of a regime, and should point out here summarily that this is an attempt to bracket the unknown and precisely unknowable democide by seeking a variety of published estimates, and most important, the highest and lowest ones from pro and anti-government sources. 8 I then consolidated these for different aspects of a regime's democide, such as for summary executions, prison deaths, or disappearances, into low to high ranges. To get an overall range for a regime, as of that for the Khmer Rouge, I then sum all the consolidated lows to get an overall low democide, the consolidated highs to get an overall high.
The value of this approach lies in the great improbability that the sum of all the lowest estimates for a regime would be above the true total or that the sum of all the highs would be below it. The fundamental methodological hypothesis here is then that the low and high sums (or the lowest low and highest high where such sums cannot be calculated) bracket the actual democide . This of course may be wrong for some events (like a massacre), an episode (like land reform), or an institution (like re-education camps), but across the years and the many different kinds of democide committed by a regime, the actual democide should be bracketed.
Within this range of possible democide, I always seek a mid-range prudent or conservative estimate. This is based on my reading of the events involved, the nature of the different estimates, and the estimates of professionals who have long studied the country or government involved. I have sought in each case the best works in English on the relevant events so that I would not only have their estimates along with the others, but that their work would guide my choice of a prudent overall estimate. The details of this effort for each case is given in the relevant appendix in the related volume, Statistics of Democide .
Given my admission that I can only come within some range of an actual democide, a range that may vary from low to high by thousands of percent, why then will I so precisely specify a democide? For example, in the chapter for communist China I will give the range of its democide as 5,999,000 to 102, 671,000, most likely 35, 236,000 people killed. Why such apparent and misleading accuracy? Why not simply make the range 5,000,000 to 105,000,000, with a mid-value of 35,000,000? This I would like to do (and have been urged by colleagues to do), but for many cases the democide figures result from calculations on or consolidations of a variety of estimates for different kinds of democide (such as for "land reform," labor camps, and the "Cultural Revolution"). When all calculations or consolidations are added together the sum comes out with such apparent precision. That is, the low and high and 35,236,000 mid-democide for communist China's democide are sums. To then give other than these sums can create confusion between the discussion of the cases and the appendices in which the estimates and calculations are given in detail.
I handle this presentation problem in this way. Where specification of the final democide figures calculated in an appendix is necessary, as in a table, I give them with all their seeming exactitude. Where, however, such is unnecessary, I will then round off to the first or second digit and use some adjective such as "near" or "around" or "about." Thus, communist China's democide was about 35,000,000.
After eight-years and almost daily reading and recording of men, women, and children by the tens of millions being tortured or beaten to death, hung, shot, and buried alive, burned or starved to death, stabbed or chopped into pieces, and murdered in all the other ways creative and imaginative human beings can devise, I have never been so happy to conclude a project. I have not found it easy to read time and time again about the horrors innocent people have been forced to suffer. What has kept me at this was the belief, as preliminary research seemed to suggest, that there was a positive solution to all this killing and a clear course of political action and policy to end it. And the results verify this. The problem is Power. The solution is democracy. The course of action is to foster freedom.
*This is a pre-publisher edited version of the "Preface" in R.J. Rummel's Death By Government , New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994
1. Rummel (1990, 1991, 1992).
2. I started this research in 1986 and the cutoff year for the collection of data was made 1987. For consistency in comparing different cases and to avoid constantly having to change total figures as new democides occurred, I have stuck to the 1987 cutoff. This means that post-1987 democides by Iraq, Iran, Burundi, Serbia and Bosnian Serbs, Bosnia, Croatia, Sudan, Somalia, the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and others have not been included.
I start the 20th century with year 1900. I realize that by our calendar the 20th century really begins with year 1901. However, I was uncomfortable with including 1900 in the previous century.
3. See Rummel ( Understanding Conflict and War , 1975-81 "Libertarianism and International Violence," 1983 "Libertarianism, Violence Within States, and the Polarity Principle," 1984 "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations: A Test Against Published Research Results," 1985). While that democracies don't make war on each other has been verified by others and well excepted by students of international relations, that democracies have the least foreign violence has been controversial and a number of studies allege they find no difference between regimes on this. But this has been due to different and in my view inappropriate methods. I argue that the more democratic (libertarian) a regime, the more the inhibition to war or foreign violence. This therefore should be tested in terms of war's severity-by the number of people killed either in total or as a proportion of the population. However, other's have tested this by correlating type of regime with the number of wars it has fought. One should not be surprised, therefore, that they find hardly any correlation between regime and war, since they are treating all wars as alike, where even the tiny democratic wars such as the American invasion of Grenada and Panama or the British Falkland Islands War are given the same weight as World War I or II for Germany or the Soviet Union. In any case, one of the side results of this study is to further substantiate that democracies have the least foreign violence, i.e., that even in war democracies suffer far fewer deaths than other regimes (see Table 1.6 and Figures 1.6, 1.7b, 1.7d, and 1.8).
4. By the Genocide Convention, genocide can refer to other than killing, such as trying to destroy a group in whole or in part by taking away its children.
5. See Note 1.
6. Rummel (1992, p. 5).
7. See Rummel (1990, Appendix A 1991, pp 309-316).
8. This has caused some misunderstanding among readers. That I use biased or ideological sources, as of communist publications on American atrocities in Vietnam or official Iraq statistics for the death toll among Kurds during the civil war, is part of my attempt to get at the lowest or highest democide or war-dead estimates. There are therefore many items in my references that no self-respecting scholar would list normally. I include them because I use their estimates and not because I believe them objective or of high quality. Moreover, the omission of a particular work from the references does not mean that I have not used it. I have consulted, read, or studied for this work many times more publications than the references list here. I have only included those I have cited in writing a chapter or those from which I have taken the estimates listed in the appendix tables. Those references listed in the Soviet, China, and Nazi democide books are not repeated here unless they also have been cited in this book.
For citations see the Death By Government REFERENCES
I also am indebted to the United States Institute of Peace for a grant to my project on comparative genocide, of which this book is a part. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its officers.
Finally and not least, my ability to complete this work and the form it took owes much to my wife Grace, much more than she knows. Thanks sweetheart.
Over the next few years, Clay served out the unexpired terms in the U.S. Senate. In 1811, Clay was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he eventually served as Speaker of the House. In all, Clay would come to serve multiple terms in the U.S. House (1811, 1815, 1823) and Senate (1806, 1810, 1831, 1849).
Clay had come to the House as a War Hawk, a leader who vocally pushed his government to confront the British over its conscription of American seamen. In part due to Clay&aposs political pressure, the United States went to war with Britain in the War of 1812. The conflict proved crucial in forging a lasting American independence from England.
But while he pushed for war, Clay also showed himself to be crucial in the peacemaking process. When the battles ceased, President James Madison appointed Clay as one of five delegates to negotiate a peace treaty with Britain in Ghent, Belgium.
On other fronts, Clay took some of the biggest issues of the day head-on. He pushed for independence for several Latin American republics, advocated for a national bank and, perhaps most significantly, argued strongly and successfully for a negotiated settlement between enslaved people-owning states and the rest of the country over its western policy. The resulting Missouri Compromise, which passed in 1820, found a necessary balance that allowed for America&aposs continued western expansion while simultaneously holding off any bloodshed over the white-hot topic of slavery.
The following table lists the build versions for Data Protection Manager 2019.
|Build Number||KB||Release Date||Description|
|10.19.58.0||n/a||March 2019||System Center 2019 Data Protection Manager RTM|
|10.19.260.0||4533416||February 2020||Update Rollup 1 for System Center 2019 Data Protection Manager|
|10.19.379.0||4563392||August 2020||Update Rollup 2 for System Center 2019 Data Protection Manager|
|10.19.458.0||5001202||March 2021||Update Rollup 3 for System Center 2019 Data Protection Manager|
The following table lists the build versions for Data Protection Manager 2016.
|4.3.1012.0||n/a||System Center 2016 Technical Preview Data Protection Manager|
|4.3.1071.0||n/a||System Center 2016 Technical Preview 2 Data Protection Manager|
|4.3.1043.0||n/a||System Center 2016 Technical Preview 3 Data Protection Manager|
|18.104.22.168||n/a||System Center 2016 Technical Preview 4 Data Protection Manager|
|22.214.171.124||n/a||System Center 2016 Technical Preview 5 Data Protection Manager|
|126.96.36.199||n/a||System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager RTM|
|188.8.131.52||3190600||Update Rollup 1 for System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager|
|5.0.322.0||3209593||Update Rollup 2 for System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager|
|5.0.342.0||4043316||Update Rollup 4 for System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager|
|5.0.361.0||4090835||Update Rollup 5 for System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager|
|5.0.375.0||4456327||Update Rollup 6 for System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager|
|5.0.409.0||4494084||Update Rollup 7 for System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager|
|5.0.457.0||4511102||Update Rollup 8 for System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager|
|5.0.525.0||4534063||Update Rollup 9 for System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager|
|5.0.622.0||4578608||Update Rollup 10 for System Center 2016 Data Protection Manager|
The following table lists the build versions for Data Protection Manager 1801.
|5.1.363.0||n/a||System Center 2016 1801|
The following table lists the build versions for Data Protection Manager 1807.
How to Recover Deleted History in Windows
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You may find yourself needing to recover your deleted internet history to determine what a previous user was browsing, to discover a lost URL, or simply to retrieve deleted information. While your internet history may be deleted on your browser, your Windows computer caches this information and it can be accessed in a variety of ways. By far the simplest method to locate your deleted history is through your Google Account. If you have a Google Account and were using it during the session you wish to access, proceed to that method. If, however, you were not using Google the process can be a little more complicated. Luckily, there are caches built into your machine from which you can access your lost history.
What gap insurance does -- and does not -- cover
We call it gap insurance. Maybe that&aposs misleading.
Questions received by CarInsurance.com show that there is a huge misconception about what gap insurance really covers. Many car owners believe gap insurance is a catch-all policy that makes their car payments anytime they&aposre unable to. That is not the case.
Gap insurance does not cover:
- car payments in case of financial hardship, job loss, disability or death
- repairs to your vehicle
- the value of your car or balance of a loan if your car is repossessed
- a rental car while your vehicle is in the shop
- the diminished value of your car after an accident
- a down payment for a new car
- carry-over balances on any loans you rolled over into your new car loan
- extended warranties you add to your car loan
In short, gap insurance isn&apost “super coverage” that protects you if you don&apost have the best auto insurance coverage or can&apost pay on your loan.
What does gap insurance do? It pays the difference, in the event of a total loss, between what you owe on the car and what it is worth in an insurance company&aposs eyes. That&aposs it.
But that&aposs a bigger deal than you might think.
When you need gap insurance, and why
According to Edmunds.com, the average new car depreciates 11 percent as soon as it leaves the dealer&aposs lot. After a year, it&aposs worth 20 percent less than new.
If you didn&apost put much down and had your taxes and licensing fees rolled into your loan, you could be upside-down (owe more than car&aposs worth) before you are a block from the dealership.
For instance: You buy a car that stickers for $24,000 and rolls out the door with taxes and fees for $26,500. You put down only $1,000, sign your financing papers, get a car insurance policy and drive off the lot.
Nearly a year later, your “new car” is totaled out. You file a collision claim with your insurer and find out that the actual cash value of your vehicle is only $19,200. This means after your $500 deductible is taken out, your car insurance company will pay out $18,700 to your lienholder.
You still owe $23,500 on the car, so you&aposre left with a “gap” of $4,800.
With a gap insurance policy that includes coverage for your deductible, this whole amount would be covered. If you didn&apost get gap insurance, you&aposre left paying the difference out of your own pocket for a car you no longer have - and that hurts, because you&aposve got to buy another car, too.
Gap is actually an acronym, meaning “guaranteed auto protection” or “guaranteed asset protection.” Its function is to provide protection in the early years, when the loan exceeds the value of the car.
Where to buy gap insurance, and should you?
Gap insurance can be purchased from the dealership, your financing institution, some car insurance companies or a stand-alone gap insurance provider. If you have a lease, gap insurance may have been added automatically into the leasing contract.
Gap insurance is usually offered when you sign your loan documents and can be incorporated right into the purchase paperwork. When you buy it in this manner, the gap insurance charge is typically a flat premium of around $500 to $700.
Liz Weston, a credit expert and personal finance columnist at MSN Money, says buying from the dealer is not necessarily a good idea. “Gap is most expensive if you buy it at the dealership, because it goes in the loan and is then plus interest,” Weston notes.
Check with your own auto insurer first for cost and availability. Costs vary due to insurance companies&apos different rating systems, but typically gap insurance is calculated as being 5 percent to 6 percent of your physical damage coverage costs. If your collision and comprehensive costs are $500, gap insurance coverage will add around $25 to your overall premium.
By checking also with stand-alone gap insurance providers, you can compare the cost of coverage. Before purchasing through a stand-alone gap provider, Weston recommends checking with A.M. Best or another rating service to make sure that the gap insurance company is stable and reputable.
Is gap insurance for you? “Probably, yes,” Weston says. “Unless you have money sitting in the bank to pay off the balance of your loan above the car&aposs worth, which most people don&apost, gap insurance would be necessary.”
Weston believes those who are underwater on their loan and have little savings need gap coverage the most. She says car owners who don&apost put 20 percent down on a car or who have a loan longer than four years are probably underwater, making gap insurance worth buying.
If you don&apost know how underwater you are, check with Edmunds and Kelley Blue Book to find out the worth of your vehicle. To find a reasonably accurate value for your car, pick a point in the middle of the trade-in and private sales amounts.